June 15, 2016
This article was updated following the terrorist attack on MP Jo Cox in Birstall, UK on June 16, 2016 and the release of the 911 transcripts of the Orlando shooting on June 20, 2016.
At 2 am US east coast time (GMT – 4), on June 12, 2016, Omar Mateen opened fire on visitors of the LGBT club “Pulse” in Orlando, Florida. Three hours later, he had killed 49 and injured as many more. While holding his hostages, Mateen called 911 and pledged allegiance to IS and, as it would be later known, also to Syria’s Nusra Front and praising his “homeboys”, the attackers behind the Boston marathon bombing, the Tsarnaev brothers.
Barely a day later, at 8h30 pm on June 13, Larossi Abballa would ambush a French police officer and his partner in the Paris suburb of Magnanville and stab them to death. Abballa, like Mateen, took the time to pledge allegiance to IS and its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, recording his pledge live on facebook.
On June 16, Thomas Mair kills British MP Jo Cox in her constituency of Birstall by shooting and stabbing her. Mair, a nationalist with far-right ties, was claimed to have screamed “put Britain first” as he attacked the outspoken pro-EU MP Cox.
The reflex from politicians, security experts and media was to label the attacks as terrorism. However, a careful examination of the known facts (as of writing this text) reveal a different picture: Only two were acts of terrorism.
The Orlando shooting was mass murder, not terrorism
To better understand the above statement, let’s begin by examining the similarities between the attacks in Orlando and Paris. First, both attackers were Muslim; second, both of them pledged allegiance to IS during the attacks (it would be later revealed that Larossi Abballa had already pledged allegiance to IS three weeks earlier); and third, both had been investigated for supporting terrorism, with only Abballa being convicted because the FBI concluded Mateen was not a threat. Sadly, in the “Age of Fear”, populism, the hyperbole and hypermedia, this appears sufficient to qualify both attacks as terrorism.
It is the differences however that allow us to properly assess and qualify the nature of the attacks. Larossi Abballa had long standing links to radical religious circles in France and central Asia. His radicalism became stronger in prison and he was still in contact with djihadi circles, especially online, after his release from prison in 2013. This was a man that knew what he wanted, who identified himself fully as a djihadi and was dedicated to the cause. He was able to plan his attack meticulously, choose his target precisely and have the patience to fully execute his plan. His murders were politically motivated and legitimately done – in his mind – for IS. His 13 minute long and detailed pledge, a renewal of his previous commitment, integrated the rhetoric of IS, its meaning and its purpose. This attack was textbook terrorism.
The same could be said about the attack on Jo Cox. Her killer was known for having some mental issues, but his political views are consistent. They are deep rooted and gradually led to murder, helped by the incredibly toxic “Brexit” campaign in the UK. In this context, he felt the need to act, killing a symbol of what he politically feared and hated. Asked his name when he was presented before the court, Mair called himself “death to traitors, freedom for Britain”. His mental issues don’t change the fact that he tried to affect political change using illegal violence, which is the very definition of terrorism. The very same applies to the attacker of the mayor of Cologne, Germany, when he tried to kill Henriette Reker on the eve of the election on October 17, 2015 because she was in favor of migration and the acceptance of refugees.
However, this is not true for the Orlando shooting. The chosen target was a place Mateen knew well, having been a regular at the club, and does not appear to have been selected for any rational reason. The target selection process was easy because he knew the place, which also suggests a more personal meaning for the shooter. The main target was also random, i.e. anyone that stood in front of him, and the fact that he indiscriminately shot again at dead bodies suggests he had little emotional control. He was in a rage. Finally, his confused pledges of allegiance to IS, the al-Nusra Front and calling the Tsarnaev brothers his “homeboys” suggest that Mateen either did not understand the organisations and people he was pledging to or simply did not know what he wanted. He had no message and his statements lacked focus, which is in sharp contrast to the attack in Magnanville for example. His pledges were meaningless, superficial at best.
On June 20, the FBI released a redacted transcript of the 911 call Mateen made during the shooting. It tells us little more than what was already known and discussed above. Which is why in this case, the audio would have been more useful, especially because they say he pledged in Arabic although reports indicate he did not speak the language. How did he recite the text? Was the “chilling” tone one of conviction or repetition? Those are key details when analysing such an attack.
The “biographies” of the shooter published by the NY Times and the Washington Post describe a man inclined towards violence but who lacked coherence in his political and religious views, and made everything about him and his status. The big question is whether or not the investigation will reveal information that demonstrates that his allegiance to IS was actually rooted in a gradual belief and identification to the views and values of the organisation. What is clear is that his pledge and the reasons he gave were verbatim what the attackers in Paris said, which amounts to imitation, not identification or conviction. To this point, the latter remains the key difference between attacks in the style of Magnanville for example and what happened in Orlando. That’s the difference between using a “terrorist” justification as a label and not a motivation.
The massacre in Orlando bears all the trademarks of a lone gunman mass murder. An easy, known venue with a degree of personal connection; victims that represented something he felt he was denied, which appears to be in this case the freedom to be who he really was; finally, attacking in a random, blinding rage that contains a certain degree of overkill, suggesting limited emotional control. What Omar Mateen did echoes the massacres at Sandy Hook Elementary or Virginia Tech University. A lone gunman, his rage triggered by something or someone, and the need to eliminate those he saw as responsible for his pain, most likely the LGTB people whose lives he envied.
Some will argue that IS claimed both attacks, and because it sees homosexuals as sinners (and also kills them), it confirms the terrorist link. This is where IS’ PR strategy comes in to play. An organisation that asks sympathisers worldwide to commit acts of terror in its name will not deny itself the privilege of claiming an attack done in its name, even if contradictory. This was the most violent mass murder in modern US history and by “claiming” it, IS made sure that this tragedy became about it, and it unfortunately worked like a charm. The debate became about IS and terrorism rather than violence against the LGBT community.
It appears at the time of writing that Omar Mateen’s wife Noor Salman was aware of his plans, being there when he purchased the weapon and driving him to “Pulse” once for him to “scope out the place”. This again does not suggest at this point an actual, political act of terrorism. If anything, it adds to the contradiction: A shooter spends more than a year “scoping out”, yet his message as to why he is doing this is incoherent. It adds to the argument that his goal was to kill LGBT people, regardless of the label he wanted to use. Therefore, this is more in line with the behaviour of a mass murderer/lone gunman than a prepared, focused terrorist.
The real lesson from these examples is that we need to take a few steps back and analyse the bigger picture. Such tragedies must not be automatically assessed through the prism of terrorism or IS or AQ, especially by the security community whose actual training and job it is to provide a sharp, rational and knowledgeable evaluation of such attacks. Not every mass killing is terrorism, not every murder committed by a Muslim is terrorism, not every claim is real. That’s why actual security professionals and prosecutors make a distinction between types of crimes, because it is necessary and helps us better understand the problems and develop as well as implement the solutions to them. Otherwise, we add to the chaos and end up doing the terrorists’ work for them, which is any terrorist organisation’s dream.