Boko Haram pledge to ISIS: Beyond the symbolic

On Saturday, March 7, the question many had been asking over the last few months finally got its answer: Nigeria‘s Boko Haram pledged its allegiance to ISIS, also know as the Islamic State. In the 48 hours since the release of the pledge’s audio track, questions about its meaning and impact have been numerous, as was pundit media presence. Boko Haram’s pledge is not trivial and its impact is as varied as it is far reaching. I will discuss how this impact can be best perceived on the various sides of the conflict, and not just by the actors involved.

Will this have an operational impact?

Any operational support – defined here as material support or troops – will unlikely come from ISIS‘ main theater of operation in Syria and Iraq. Rather, it is the organization’s “colonies” and affiliates in Libya who would provide operational support, essentially because the main north/south trafficking routes are along the Nigeria/Niger/Libya axis. Boko Haram has already benefited greatly from this route, and with ISIS strongly present in a good portion of the trafficking end points in MENA, ISIS has made itself unavoidable. Most of the trafficking goes through them now. This northern trafficking axis added value in recent weeks and months, as the eastern route which goes through the Horn of Africa has become increasingly difficult to use. This is due to the MJTF operation that limits access to the east, Al Shabaab’s troubles and the Houthis/AQAP conflict in Yemen. These developments disturb trafficking from and to the east out of west Africa and all but ensured that any operational support for Boko Haram would be confined to the north axis.

Some may argue that the operational would also extend to tactical and strategic consulting. While this is true, the pledge will not alter this aspect of the conflict because Boko Haram has benefited from external experience for a while now, and these changes have been quite visible for the last twelve months.

Will this affect the finances of both organizations?

It will, even though both organizations’ finances are not as good as advertised to begin with. Boko Haram’s finances soared in 2014 because it could tax and control trafficking routes and ensure a steady income through smuggling. With the Lake Chad basin routes, a crucial smuggling and trading area, Boko Haram’s control provided a steady income, one complemented by 419 scams, money laundering and the typical plundering and robbing of towns, most of which went to the foot soldiers who carried out the raids. The pressure on the eastern roads and increased monitoring of its activities have dented the income’s stability and created financial problems for Boko Haram.

As for ISIS, several in depth investigations have revealed that the organization’s finances are in worse shape than advertised, and they are dwindling. Despite the “colonies”, the impact of the anti-IS coalition attacks also hurt the group’s finances. The pledge and its acceptance – the latter is a formality because discussions were already under way – will allow both organizations to set better financial terms for their common business while ensuring a level of financial support and the access to “new” markets for the smuggled merchandise. In short, this allows both organizations to improve their income structures.

Will this affect the fighters?

This will certainly affect morale in both groups. Intelligence obtained by MOSECON shows pride and enthusiasm, as well as a welcoming tone from ISIS supporters, whereas Boko Haram supporters have been silent. Where the impact will mostly be felt for Boko Haram and its fighters is in recruitment, which has been difficult of late for them. Having the ISIS umbrella will allow Boko Haram to promote joining a “winner” with credibility, reputation and success. This is what smaller groups did in Libya, Egypt and elsewhere, and the effects have been beneficial to them. By associating itself to ISIS, Boko Haram gains a level of credibility, something it sorely lacked (despite its success) due to its brutal reputation. This credibility will be more attractive for fighters whether for salary, advancement or success.

Will this affect the MJTF’s operations in Nigeria?

Not really. Boko Haram recently received new weapons, and that speaks much for the crackdown on the trafficking routes. It should have an impact in battle but not enough to turn the tide right now. Boko Haram maintained its tactic of raiding east and bombing west in spite of MJTF successes, and more of the same is to be expected. Therefore, it’s up to the MJTF to make sure its strategy is effective and well implemented. The pledge to ISIS is not Boko Haram’s lifeboat nor does it mean that the MJTF’s eventual success will be the end of Boko Haram. It may affect some smaller variables of the operation but not enough to change the current situation.

What is the international impact?

Two aspects stand out internationally after the pledge was made public: The first concerns Al Shabaab, the second the United Nations.

In Shabaab’s case, times have been difficult. Their leader was killed and their intelligence chiefs were either killed or turned themselves in. Additionally, Al Shabaab’s ties to AQAP prompted the latter to use Al Shabaab’s best fighters for their own battles in Yemen, which left less experienced and competent fighters to continue the battle in Somalia and Kenya. With some AQAP members defecting to ISIS, Boko Haram’s pledge adds pressure on Shabaab to either maintain its ties to Al Qaeda or align itself with ISIS. The question within AS to join ISIS or remain with Al Qaeda is truly divisive for the group, as confirmed by intel obtained by MOSECON. Finally, one must not forget that Al Shabaab, despite its struggles, still has much to offer especially logistically in Somalia and Kenya, as well as passage to Yemen. It could be in a position to pledge to the highest bidder.

Boko Haram’s pledge changes the frame in which the AU’s resolution against Boko Haram – sponsored by France – will be presented to the United Nations’ Security Council. ISIS’ presence in Nigeria, via Boko Haram, would most likely impact the adoption of the resolution that would allow international troops to operate in the Lake Chad basin region under UN mandate. If such a resolution is worded to be against ISIS alone, its adoption would affect the debate on the ISIS question in Syria and whether the UN can adopt a resolution allowing it to intervene in Syria, something Russia has opposed to this point. If it remains focused only on Boko Haram, then the resolution could be adopted with little difficulty. However, it’s hard to imagine such a strict distinction from ISIS – at least diplomatically – and the pledge certainly affects the dynamic of the Lake Chad problem in the UNSC. In any case, Boko Haram’s pledge to ISIS will neither accelerate the advent of a “super-caliphate” nor dramatically change the way things are conducted in Nigeria, Syria, Iraq or Libya. There will be some change though, and it will affect some battles but not the wars.

Some have argued that the pledge is essentially symbolic. I don’t agree with that. The impact is far deeper than PR, a symbol or superficial elements. It allows for business as usual under another name, something not only problematic as it is, but also sufficient to complicate things even further.