January 16, 2015
The first full week of the new year is a stark reminder of just how present and diverse terrorism is. The week began with Nigeria‘s Islamist organization Boko Haram laying waste to the town of Baga, the surrounding region and the multinational joint task force base located there. With much unconfirmed at this point, the rampage may have gone on for five days and resulted in the deaths of between 150 and 2000 people, while provoking the exodus of over 7000 refugees.
As this was happening, a suicide bomber made her way to an Istanbul police station and detonated her device there, resulting in the death of a police officer. The attack was first claimed by a far-left group, the DHKP-C, but they then retracted and now suspicion turns to a possible Dagestani and/or Chechen operation. Other attacks in Istanbul during the same period include a bombing attempt in a shopping mall on January 10 and a grenade attack in the presidential palace on January 1. On January 6, the police training academy in the Yemen capital of Sana’a was bombed and resulted in the deaths of 38 people, an attack possibly linked to the conflict between Houthis and Al Qaida in Yemen (AQAP).
Most notorious however are the attacks perpetrated on January 7 on the staff of the French weekly Charlie Hebdo and the one at Paris kosher supermarket on January 8. Attacks that left a combined 17 people dead, many French and other Westerners wondering what happened, Muslims fearing reprisals and French Jews pondering emigration from France.
All of these attacks, though different in style and purpose, raised numerous questions, and few solutions were proposed on how to actually deal with these problems. Bearing in mind that each terrorist attack is unique, that the contexts and perpetrators vary greatly and that much remains unknown at this point, the following are suggested first steps to help mitigate the impact of terrorism. As I’ve already discussed solutions to the insurgency of Boko Haram in various posts and articles in 2014, I will focus on the response to the attacks in France.
Terrorism in Europe and North America
Since 2011, most terrorist attacks in the West were perpetrated by lone individuals or very small groups (maximum 3). Anders Breivik, Mohammed Merah, Mehdi Nemmouche, Martin Rouleau, Michael Zehaf-Bibeau and Amedy Coulibaly, to name a few, acted alone, but not all of them were “lone wolves”. The Kouachi and Tsarnaev brothers attacked as a pair, the same goes for Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale when they murdered Lee Rigby. Germany’s now infamous NSU trio of Uwe Mundlos, Uwe Böhnhardt and Beate Zschäpe – the latter currently on trial – spent 10 years murdering individuals, planting bombs and robbing banks, before the veil was lifted on their activities.
The trend is easy to spot here: The smaller the better. Whether as a lone wolf or as a lone attacker who receives support from a larger organization, it’s obvious that terrorists planning attacks in the West have decided to go small in order to attract less attention, increase mobility and flexibility, resulting in “small” but nonetheless efficient attacks with a large impact. This impact is not necessarily in the amount of the lives lost, but how it affects the way of life and security policies of numerous countries.
The challenge with these small groups – and this has been mentioned several times over the last few years – is that they are impossible to anticipate. Much like mass killers, the lone wolves or lone perpetrators don’t stand out, and security forces become aware of their existence only when the deed is done. As for those that do attract attention like Chérif Kouachi and Martin Rouleau, they are often perceived as not threatening enough, or as former French anti-terror magistrate Jean-Louis Bruguière put it, “small fry”. This leads either to their release, minimal surveillance (or none at all) or dismissal altogether, because security forces must make choices, manage resources and prioritize threats. Very often their assessment is right, but when it’s wrong, it leads to attacks like the one in Paris or in St-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Canada.
Another issue that has come up and has not been limited to the West is the use of the “what’s at hand” weapon. In Israel, attacks were made using tractors; Lee Rigby’s killers used a knife; Martin Rouleau used his car (as have others in France to attack during the holidays); Michael Zehaf-Bibeau an old shotgun; the Tsarnaev brothers used pressure cookers for bombs, while Mennouche, Coulibaly and the Kouachi brothers used various firearms. In short, terrorists now use anything available to them as a weapon, whether sophisticated or crude, high-tech or low-tech.
So, if anything can be used as a weapon and terrorists make themselves small enough to pass through the meshes of the security net, how should the West respond?
1. Think practical, not political
Terrorist attacks can make or break politicians, all depending on how they handle the situation. Former U.S. president George W. Bush made a name for himself after the attacks of September 11, 2001 while Jose Maria Aznar committed political suicide with his horrendous handling of the Madrid bombing on March 11, 2004. The pressure to “do something” is nearly unbearable and presses leaders to act and propose solutions immediately, either on threat management or public relations grounds. The political opposition adds pressure, because it can exploit an attack to position itself as the proper alternative. This was visible after the Charlie Hebdo attacks, when many right/far-right groups in Europe immediately tried to capitalize the tragedy, the most prominent example of which is this.
Under such circumstances, knee jerk reactions and the proposal of broad stroke solutions are most dangerous. While it’s imperative that leaders demonstrate their firmness, resolve and capacity to lead a country through difficult times, managing or exploiting the political component of an attack is not a solution. Case and point is the idea of increased surveillance powers. French PM Manuel Valls asked for it, so did David Cameron and Germany’s Interior Minister Thomas de Maizière. However, Germany’s Justice Minister Heiko Maas is opposed to the idea, revealing the fractions within the cabinet on the issue.
While increasing surveillance powers may sound good and responsive, the reality of their use is not. Beyond the numerous ethical issues, the practicality of it is impossible. First, because some terrorists, like Michael Zehaf-Bibeau who attacked Canada’s parliament building, are not very active online if at all. In such a case, surveillance would need to be physical, either with someone assigned to that person, wire-tapping or camera surveillance. This also implies knowing what to look for, which is the most difficult task in the first place. Second, the flood of information that comes with meta-data is so vast that resources, both human and technological required to filter it – despite top algorithms – are never sufficient to properly assess a threat. So much of the information either gets drowned in noise or is uncovered too late. Finally, at what point is a person deemed non-threatening? The surveillance on the Kouachi brothers, according to French police, was interrupted because security forces had to prioritize and the brothers no longer ranked high enough on the list to warrant continued surveillance.
Some may argue for the use of preventive arrests – legal in many Western countries – but prison over-crowding and radicalization while incarcerated are real problems, which limit the applicability of such a measure, not to mention the ethical issues.
So although politically meaningful, the proposal to increase surveillance is not very practical. However, while it might not solve all of the problems, working on an increased operational budget for security forces would allow for prioritization, and at the same time enabling second or third degree monitoring of cases that are deemed at risk. This would come with the added bonus of political usefulness.
Another idea is gun control, which again sounds good, but is not very practical, because if the weapons are not household items or cars, the odds are they’ve been obtained illegally, and gun control policies are usually aimed at controlling legal purchases of firearms. Thus the focus should turn to countering trafficking and not to restrictions on the legal acquisition of weapons. In addition, many people involved in counter-terrorism from the judiciary side will tell you that it’s not necessary to fly to Syria or Iraq, in order to learn how to use a weapon. The streets of numerous cities worldwide offer this possibility, just as they offer the possibility for radicalization. So yes, travelling to Syria or Iraq or Libya could be an indication of potential weapons’ training, but the person might have already used a weapon before he left.
So again, while these “solutions” are politically attractive, they don’t translate much into effective counter-terrorism. Most security forces have enough powers and material at their disposal. What they lack are resources, financially and in terms of personnel, to be able to use them adequately.
2. Think like the terrorist: Small, flexible, adaptable
In responding to attacks, a problem with strategists and decision makers is the need to go for the general, large scope measures, which only add to the judiciary and bureaucratic processes’ burden, and thereby hinder their flexibility and adaptability. What counter-terrorism and judiciary personnel really need is the ability to make quick, applicable decisions when dealing with a terrorist threat.
Ironically, France gave itself such powers with the 1986 Pasqua law that created the 14e parquet de Paris. As I wrote back in 2008:
The 1986 Pasqua law, named after the then Interior minister, created the 14e section spéciale du parquet de Paris, a special judicial branch composed of six anti-terror judges that handle all terrorism related cases. This law states that anyone suspected of terrorism may be arrested and held without charge for four days, with a possible extension of 48 hours if a terrorist act is deemed imminent. However, if the judge states intent to prosecute, the suspect may be held indefinitely, in some cases numerous years.
In the Paris case, we know how Jean-Louis Bruguière dismissed Chérif Kouachi, but the 14e section spéciale du parquet the Paris was and is designed to afford that flexibility and quick response. The problem was a lack of resources.
Despite the failure in the Charlie Hebdo attacks, the model offered by the 14e section spéciale is nonetheless a good one, that definitely warrants looking into by decision makers from other countries. It must not necessarily be reproduced one to one – it must be adapted to a state’s own realities – but many of its powers and the practicability of these can be well exported.
Flexibility and adaptability also allow for a more involved approach, which could be achieved by using more HUMINT resources, with ears on the ground and eyes at meetings. Some may consider this to be an expensive and “slower” tactic, but it offers the possibility to notice the more subtle and nuanced elements of radical circles or areas, most of which cannot be picked up by algorithms, especially if the online presence is non-existent. You will notice that in the “failed plot to attack the Capitol” revealed on January 14, the arrest was made following an undercover operation. While even the prosecutor dismissed the threat level of the would-be terrorist as negligible, the combination of HUMINT and SIGINT with the flexibility they offer were successful and will be in other cases too, mediatized or not.
Terrorists adapt to the security measures we enact and implement, but we often fail to do the same. Casting a larger, tighter net cannot be the solution. What is required is the proper net, cast in the right areas, and this means granting security forces the sufficient and appropriate resources for them to act on a threat.
In part two of this post, I will discuss a few more solutions, including appropriate strategic planning, the impact of technology and understanding the reality of security.