June 19, 2013

Putting PRISM into Perspective

In light of the PRISM surveillance scandal in the United States, it would be fitting to begin this post with a quote from Orwell’s 1984. However, the book’s recent surge in sales render this requirement moot.
Although much is being said about “Big Brother” and the breach of privacy, nothing is being said about the meaning of the PRISM program and other similar initiatives throughout the Western world. What underlines the scope and depth of PRISM is a huge turnaround in the security culture that began after 9/11, namely that we are now guilty until proven innocent.
While I will be among the first to argue that large scale surveillance is not new, the scope of it, based on three factors, is. First, this century’s exponential development of technology; second, the self-imposed reduction of the private sphere via the constant use of social media; and third, the furtive and stealthy nature of the threat used as justification: terrorism.
Surveillance until recently needed to be targeted because the logistics required to proceed with surveillance operations were much more complicated. With companies like Google, Apple or Facebook doing their own data collecting and mining, governments now only need to ask for the information rather than proceed with the collection themselves. This “collaboration” reduces the complexity of surveillance programs significantly while allowing governments to allocate more resources to analysis and limit legal entanglements.
The most important consequence of the advent of social media and its widespread use is the blurring of private and public spheres. While social media expand the way we communicate and interact with each other, it has also altered the scope of the information we share with each other. Most posts are about personal actions: what we do, where we are, who our friends are, what we like or dislike, and what we think. As such, we are doing the surveillance ourselves – with our various semi-public posts. By sharing everything we do and are, we have turned our private sphere into a public domain, willingly forsaking our privacy in the process. We not only make surveillance easier, but we also give governments de facto permission to access this information. Thus it is possible to argue that the  PRISM program is legitimate and legal. How can it be a breach of privacy or an illegal collection of information if we ourselves make this private information public and available for the taking? This raises the issue of our own responsibility and participation in current surveillance programs and calls for further debate.
The third factor at the core of this cultural change in security is the definition of terrorism as the main threat to our way of life. Terrorism is frightening; terrorism is spectacular; terrorism sears itself in the mind and imagination of people; and sadly, terrorism has a romantic, attractive value for many. Terrorism is also faceless and impossible to stop, stealthy and unpredictable. These elements are its biggest assets and the nightmares of those responsible for our safety.
With the increasing importance of the erroneous concept of “homegrown terrorism“, governments must now deal with a threat that cannot be defined nor properly profiled. The target is blurry, and no longer clear cut, as classically understood under the parameters of the “Us versus Them” analysis. The threats are multiple and increasingly dangerous, and government resources and capabilities for response are limited. What solution remains if one is overwhelmed by a threat and responsibilities? The answer is simple: To expand the preventive and pre-emptive strategy and tactics to its maximum scope i.e. to assess everyone as a potential threat, whether primary, secondary or tertiary. This ensures that all bases are covered and that nothing is overlooked. In short, we are now guilty until proven innocent.
This is the most important political and policy change this century has seen. And the one we should truly be worried about.
A survey conducted this week by the Washington Post revealed well over 50% of Americans approved of the surveillance for security purposes. My own research over the years revealed that many justify this approval with the response “I have nothing to hide”. The problem with this is not whether people have something to hide but rather what are the norms and who defines them. The standards of proper behavior vary from party to party, decision maker to decision maker. Consequently, the reasons for surveillance vary accordingly. By inheriting the burden of proof, we make ourselves vulnerable to more subjective norms and standards rather than more objective ones, and therein lies the danger of the PRISM program, regardless of its effectiveness.
The widespread use of surveillance is a true product of our times, spawned from new social habits, technology development, political goals and security needs. Very few people will argue that there is no need for surveillance, but we must establish strong safeguards to ensure that some of the oldest principles at the core of our societies remain intact regardless of the threat. The NSA surveillance scandal should remind us of that.