On December 24, 2015, Nigeria’s President Muhammudu Buhari stated that “Boko Haram has been technically defeated” because, according to him, they could no longer “[articulate] conventional attacks on centres of communication and populations”. The terrorist organisation was limited to attacking with IEDs and therefore a reduced threat.
Only President Buhari and his entourage know why he made such a statement, although the government and the army have a history of terrible public relations when it comes to Boko Haram. The statement was odd not only because it is false – people still died by dozens from attacks, including the day following his statement – but also because it was made during a period in which Boko Haram has historically been very active.
On January 31, 2016, Boko Haram launched another attack on Gombi, following the raids on Dalori, Wanori and Kofa on January 30 that left nearly 100 dead. This marked the seventh day in a row, the fourth attack in Nigeria during that span, where Boko Haram either attacked using suicide bombers or assaulted villages, including some in Cameroon and Chad. With seven days, the organisation nearly killed 200 and hit three countries using various tactics. The organisation is again on a terrorism/killing spree that last for weeks at a time, as it so often did in 2014 and 2015.
Boko Haram (whose official name is ISWAP) is clearly not defeated, technically or otherwise. Nor are they on the “back foot”. They are strong and have access to numerous resources, and have steadily grown since August 2013. This post’s aim is to provide a certain degree of understanding as to why this is, nearly seven years into the conflict, and if the situation has the potential to change soon.
Why does Boko Haram keep “coming back”?
BH, like Al Shabaab, is not resurgent. Their presence and strength have been steady for many years now, and since 2013, their evolution – as an organisation and strategically – has been constant, despite setbacks and changes. The attack patterns have been cyclical and steady, as is the tactic of mixing suicide bombers with raids throughout north-east Nigeria and the Lake Cad region, visible again in January.
Pledging allegiance to the “Islamic State” and morphing into “Islamic State West Africa Province” – Wilāyat Gharb Ifrīqīyyah – also deeply impacted the evolution of Boko Haram. Much more than a symbolic relationship, the move allowed BH to access a much broader network of resources that includes know-how, material, weapons, vehicles and money. It also allowed them to expand their reach and effectiveness, giving them a non-negligible presence in several countries, including some beyond the Lake Chad region.
It is arguably the access to the resources that is the biggest problem in fighting Boko Haram. Their access to constant streams of material and people ensures their strength is always replenished. Since June 2014, the organisation has used well over one hundred of suicide bombers for its many attacks, using usually three bombers per attack, sometimes five. Yet the stream of people willing to “martyr” themselves for Boko Haram seems unending. No other terrorist organisation has been able to use as many suicide bombers and for such an extended period as ISWAP is doing and will keep on doing for the foreseeable future. As long as it has access to large supply streams and there are people willing to die for them – the access to both has been steady – Boko Haram will enjoy success and keep up its pace.
Why does Nigeria’s army have so much difficulty defeating Boko Haram?
There are several factors, many that are well known such as corruption, poor equipment or low morale. I want to focus on two elements that are seldom mentioned: The actual strategy used by the army and Nigeria’s state of security.
The problem with the Nigerian strategy is stubbornly wanting to deal with Boko Haram solely from a military perspective. Historically, the army has been the guarantor of security in Nigeria and dwarfed any other security structure in the country. But Boko Haram is fighting on multiple fronts – ideologically, militarily, economically, internationally and politically – many of which are well beyond the army’s capabilities. The army and government however refuse to acknowledge this and it not only fuels their own lack of success, but allows ISWAP to grow and maintain its pace. The simple truth is that no army in the world can be effective on all fronts, especially when it is fighting something as disruptive and furtive as terrorism.
It is essential for the Nigerian army to recognise this and allow the Nigeria Police Force (NPF), the State Security Service (SSS), local community leaders and civil society to complement its resources and join the fight against Boko Haram. By doing so, it will partly overcome its poor credibility issues and be in a position to fight the ideological and financial appeal of ISWAP, while being able to use tactics that will be quicker, more flexible and better adapted to those of the terrorists. More importantly, it will allow it to be pro-active in the fight rather than reactive i.e. always one step behind – and therefore be in a position to turn the table on Boko Haram.
As long as the terrorists maintain their levels of success, their appeal and the myth surrounding them will continue to grow. That means more fighters and more political support. If Boko Haram continues to be perceived as a more credible provider of financial and physical security – the lesser of two evils – its power will increase. That means less support for the Nigerian army and the government. If citizens of “liberated areas” do not see security reinforced and programs put in place to help with the social and infrastructure reconstruction of their town and areas, they will not feel safe in both the short and long term. The sense of vulnerability and insecurity will remain.
Those are all things that urgently need to happen, but that can only be achieved by putting aside ego and prestige, and by complementing all the resources of the Nigerian society. This will allow the government to have and implement a comprehensive, versatile and effective strategy against Boko Haram. But by stubbornly sticking to the “military only” strategy, it will only perpetuate the problems of the last six and a half years.
The second factor, which is perhaps more complicated than the first, is Nigeria’s overall security issues. Two aspects come to mind that greatly affect the fight against Boko Haram. The first is the mounting number of insurgency pockets. In the last few months, the Indigenous People of Biafra movement (IPOB), the Islamic Movement Nigeria and ex-MEND members have all incurred the wrath of the federal government. All have seen the use of political violence and repression by the Nigerian army and the detention of some of the group leaders – especially of the IPOB and IMN – have led to calls for revenge and to arms. Meanwhile, ex-MEND members have been very active in January with numerous attacks on pipelines and touring local villages to garner more support. In all three cases, the situation could rapidly devolve and stretch the already overwhelmed resources of the Nigeria army even further. In short, the army could be facing four domestic battle fronts in the near future.
The second aspect is the economy. The plummeting oil prices are killing the Nigerian economy, which is extremely dependent on its oil revenue to operate. This affects the resources the government and the army have at their disposal, which will further complicate the issue of the procurement of equipment and the payment of wages. The real problem however will mostly come from the unrest that will emerge as Nigerians struggle even more to provide for their families. In despair, many will turn to organised crime or terrorist organisations for support, increasing already potent criminality and insecurity in the process, making it a fifth front to deal with.
The situation in Nigeria is bad, but it is not irreversible. The key is understanding and accepting that the way things are currently managed is wrong. The Nigerian army must understand that it is not all powerful and that it needs help – much more than new weapons – in its fight against Boko Haram. It must understand that it must work together with Chad, Cameroon and Niger to prevent Boko Haram from reaching its fall back positions and to cut its resources, streams and network. It must also understand that the only way it will truly defeat ISWAP is by destroying the myth around it, and for this it needs a credibility it does not have and cannot have without partners. It needs to become flexible, not more rigid in its approach to security.
The federal government will help this by changing its own rigid approach and by diversifying its economy. So often have I been told and read that Nigeria is a self-sustaining country with plenty of resources. It must rediscover this versatility and the richness of its resources rather than sustaining its dependence on oil. This will create jobs, help with infrastructure, help with morale and protect Nigeria from the pitfalls of a single revenue economy. It will also restore hope and credibility.
It is essential that the government and the army break the mould of the last 50 years if it is to overcome terrorism and insecurity. Without change, without accepting the need to change, it will not be able to adapt to the current threats and thousands will continue to be murdered.
2 responses
Thank you for your thoughtful comment. It is extremely difficult though credit must be given where due as the number of bombers arrested/stopped before they could reach their target has increased in recent months. That said, the number of suicide bombers used by BH makes things more complicated as seen in last week attack on Maiduguri as 1 bomber was stopped at a checkpoint, another by civilians and the 3rd sadly got away and attacked a market.
This is why it is imperative that the FG also focus on providing alternatives for citizens of the north, something that can counter the appeal of BH. Otherwise, no security measure in the world will suffice.
It is usually very difficult to identify any person who is hell-bent in killing himself/herself due to unconventional warfare deployed by the Boko Haram sect in any given suicide bombing.
It is, also, foolhardy for anyone to successfully locate, identify and eliminate or demobilize a determined suicide-bomber who is poker-faced and as tactful and tactical as he or she is ever deadly, except by reflections, confessions, sabotage or some other means — not infrinquently most venturesome, indeed!!
— Michael Ikechukwu Diogu (Nigeria).