July 31, 2013
The military coup that ousted Mohammed Morsi, Egypt’s first democratically elected President, sets a terrible precedent for states undergoing or yearning to undergo a democratic transition from authoritarian rule. What is more, it sets the stage for continued and longstanding violence in Egypt. It dissolves any modicum of democratic trust that was once, if ever, extant between political groups and social movements, most of whom stood together at the outset of the Egyptian ‘Arab Spring’ to call for the downfall of the Mubarak regime, greater social justice, and a democratic political system. And it very well may have dire repercussions for the only likely democratic regime to emerge from the ‘Arab Spring’ in the first place: the birthplace of this ‘Spring,’ Tunisia.
It is perhaps with a stroke of irony that analysts, political scientists and theorists, pundits and politicians often cite Turkey as an appropriate ‘model’ for the region. Indeed, both Ennahda (in Tunisia) and the Muslim Brotherhood (in Egypt) referenced the Turkish model as exemplary, though between them they intended drastically different things by way of reference to Turkey’s admixture of Islam and democracy (Ennahda has maintained from the get-go that it is a ‘civil’ party, whereas the Muslim Brotherhood has insisted on its adherence to Islam while also outwardly relaying its respect for democratic principles). For what transpired in Egypt is closer to the Turkish model than most could have anticipated, the Muslim Brotherhood of all. In a move seemingly out of the Turkish playbook, the Egyptian military claims that it is “protecting” the revolution – and democracy – by overturning the democratically elected government and ousting its President.
Citing inefficiency, anti-democratic moves, and political favouritism too onerous to bear, the military weighed in following a protest incited by Tamarod, a political group that organized to oppose the Muslim Brotherhood with a list of (apparently) 20 million-plus signatures, and demanded that the Morsi government either meet the group’s unrealistic dictates or step down. Before Morsi and the Brotherhood knew what had hit them, the President was arrested, the military stepped in, and the leadership of the Brotherhood was hunted down like during the days of authoritarian-style Egypt. Sure, an interim government has been sworn in, but it is quite clear that the military – and not the people – are in control of Egypt.
While it is true that there were vast inefficiencies, anti-democratic moves (including most blatantly a decree introduced by Morsi to avail himself of wide and sweeping executive powers in November), and political favouritism, there is no justification for military intervention to “hit the reset button” on Egypt’s revolution. It would behove us all to make note that no such “reset button” exists. As Zach Beauchamp has made abundantly clear, the political theory of a coup against anti-democratic measures in the name of democracy, especially when undertaken by the military, simply does not hold water. Neither the coup, nor any ‘democracy’ that results from it (though anything close to democracy is highly unlikely at this point in any case) is legitimate. The people could have ousted Morsi democratically by way of protest. The courts could have ousted Morsi democratically by way of the judiciary. But by stepping in, the military has effectively stamped out democracy in Egypt.
When the coup first occurred I was quite disappointed with not only the military, but with the secular and liberal factions, too. It seems as though those opposed to Morsi never even gave him a chance. Liberals and seculars alike boycotted much of the democratic process from day one. Storming out of constitutional assembly meetings, refusing to participate in town hall meetings, and constantly deriding the Muslim Brotherhood and the Morsi government portended the worst, really. I suspected then as I do now that had the old-guard, secularists, or liberals taken Egypt’s first democratic elections they would have been no less inclined towards favoritism and would have sidelined their political opponents just as Morsi and the Brotherhood did.
Democratic transitions aren’t easy. Most fail. And that’s because, frankly, democracy isn’t an easy regime type to establish. It doesn’t simply happen after people vote for the first time, as the popular adage goes: democracy happens after the second (or third, or fourth) election, not the first. But more than that, democracy isn’t only a matter of procedure. The substantive part is what really counts. The protests in Egypt that led to the downfall of the Mubarak regime were inspirational. Stories of camaraderie, bravery, and selflessness were abundant. But that spirit is long gone. And it if it is not remembered soon and recalled as if for a rededication to that mission, it is unlikely that it will be recovered at all.
Upon learning that Tamarod was aided by the United States, that Egyptian billionaire Naguib Sawiris was financing the coup without the group’s knowledge, that the military was relaying information to Tamarod through third parties all along, that the police were purposively neglecting their duties to maintain order, that the secular and liberal contingents who once protested against the military for its abuse of power, abuses of human rights and dignities were now lauding the military and its efforts, and that gas was made scarce to destabilize the economy, the daily running of the country and the Morsi government, I was angered by the complete and utter dirty handedness of it all. Those aspects are underreported, especially by the American left, worst of all.
Reports claim that 26% of Egyptians support the coup, while the military has allegedly inflated the figures of how many protestors were against the Morsi regime. No one has independently verified whether Tamarod actually garnered 20 million-plus signatures, but it’s doubtful. Propaganda is everywhere. A return to dictatorship is evident. Everything is called into question about what is actually happening in Egypt save for a few dismal indications that the country will not recover from this un-democracy anytime soon. For one, the interim constitution is as bad, if not worse, than the old one. The timeline is too short, the template too authoritarian, and the military, not the people, are at the helm. Egypt’s institutions consider themselves to be above politics, and certainly above democracy. The “Balkanization” of the Egyptian state is ever greater now that the military has made a move to regain its prominence that was lost under Sadat. The police and intelligence services are almost certain to try to reassert themselves in the face of it all. The liberals (sic) have been sidelined in the process, while the Islamists are facing the threat of fracture. And although most international governments are not for the coup, they are not against it either.
Given the political assassination of (another) one of Tunisia’s revered opposition figures and the formation of a Tunisian Tamarod that is calling for the dissolution of the National Constituent Assembly and the fall of the Tunisian government, the instantiation of aspects of Egypt’s failures loom too close for comfort in the birthplace of the ‘Arab Spring,’ potentially stamping out the Middle East’s closest ever experiment with mass protests and democratic politics region-wide.
About the Author
Matt Gordner is a Trudeau Scholar and a PhD student at the University of Toronto’s Department of Political Science. Matt holds an Honours BA in Philosophy and Political Science from York University, an MA (magna cum laude) in Middle Eastern History from Tel Aviv University, and an MA in Political Theory from the University of Alberta. Gordner specializes in Middle Eastern politics, comparative politics, and political theory. Specifically, his research focuses are on democratization in the Arab world, Islamist and secular-liberal discourses, and Israeli-Palestinian politics. Gordner’s dissertation work centers on a comparison of Egyptian and Tunisian democratic transition. He has received a number of awards for community involvement and academic achievement, including the Queen Elizabeth II Award, the Alberta Heritage Award, and the Government of Alberta Citizenship Award. Gordner is a Senior Analyst at Consultancy Africa Intelligence and the director of The Peace by Piece Initiative, a non-profit organization dedicated to dialogue on sensitive issues of local and global scope.