How to deal with Boko Haram?

The civilian massacre on February 19, attributed to the Nigerian islamist group Boko Haram, is rumored to include suicide bombers. This followed the perhaps most mediatized attack by Boko Haram since the school massacre in late September 2013, and once again prompts concern and questioning on the security situation in Nigeria since 2009. The situation is now so dire that the Borno governor finally admitted that Boko Haram is better equipped than the government security forces. This merely officialized what our well positioned contact in Nigeria told us, namely that Boko Haram is actually equipped with NATO weaponry.

Readers of our blog know that MOSECON is very active in Nigeria through our Managing Director, Africa, Mr Uzoma Kingsley, and our annual Nigeria Emergency Response and Counter-Terrorism Workshop (NERCT). This gives us excellent insight into the security situation in the country, particularly relating to Boko Haram, and we wish to share with you some of that insight and suggestions how to possibly overturn a situation that is getting more dire by the the day. As many analysts and media outlets discussed what and who Boko Haram is, we turn our focus to the reason for their success and why the Nigerian government is having such difficulties in dealing with them.

The first problem Nigerian authorities have is they do not consider the bigger geostrategic and geopolitical pictures. Our colleagues that deal with security issues in MENA and central Africa know that there’s a “logistical belt” stretching from East to West, that allows weapons and supplies to be transported across the continent and re-supply para-military groups like Al Shabaab, Boko Haram, ISIS, groups associated with AQIM, and all other groups in conflicts areas like Mali, Niger, Central African Republic, South Sudan or Democratic Republic of Congo just to name a few. This belt allows Boko Haram to obtain state-of-the-art weapons and resources, all the more because of Nigeria’s 144 entry points only six (6) are properly monitored, which means smugglers don’t need to smuggle too hard to allow Boko Haram to be supplied. Add to this the rampant corruption and low morale, Nigerian governments must therefore deal with the organized crime of other states in order to prevent their enemy from getting stronger, or to be able to fall back, regroup and counter-attack. A tighter border security would go a long way in disabling Boko Haram.

There is also a lack of proper strategy in the war against Boko Haram, because the focus is on weaponry rather than on strategy and adaptation. Yes, this is a military operation, but it has failed in adapting its tactics. In many cases, Boko Haram members not only know the terrain better than the Joint Task Force (JTF) does, but its vehicle of choice is the motorcycle, which is much better suited for the narrow streets, alleys and terrain of Nigeria. The JTF in turn uses tanks and other armored vehicles, which lack the speed and the mobility to properly counter the hit and run tactics used by Boko Haram. At a loss, local governments are now turning to the “Civilian JTF” i.e. vigilante groups with the hope that they will succeed where the real JTF could not.

This last point underlines the greatest advantage Boko Haram has over the federal government, namely credibility. One of the roots of Boko Haram is the grievances of the northern population against the federal government and the lack of proper governance and structure that fosters poverty in Nigeria’s already poorest region. Not unlike Hamas and Hizballah, who also provided structure where there was none – albeit unofficially – Boko Haram sought and turned these grievances into a tool for radicalization, preying on the insatisfaction of the population and the negligence of state officials and apparatus. It allowed them to develop a popular base that strengthened their membership, their expansion, their resources and above all, gave them a local legitimacy for which the Nigerian government has yet to develop a counter-narrative. The result is a passive or active support that Boko Haram, not unlike other criminal organizations, knows how to exploit and turn into an asset.

This is not to say that Boko Haram is popular. The massacres of children and members of other religious affiliations foster fear and horror in the regions where they are active and ensure that their waning support is counteracted – again, just like organized criminality – by intimidation.

Boko Haram has grown way beyond a mere sect or a terrorist group. It is a powerful para-military group with a strong logistical structure. The various governments of Nigeria must first understand this and realize that the variables that allow Boko Haram to be a formidable enemy are interactive, that they are sociopolitical, geopolitical, geostrategic, economic and international, and what happens in MENA and east Africa also has an impact on Nigeria’s internal security. Only a strategy that takes all these elements and their chemistry into account will put an end to the weekly massacres of innocent civilians and stop what could turn into a full fledged civil war.