February 18, 2015
In part 1 of this article, I addressed the need for practical and flexible thinking to counter-terrorism. However, this is only possible if the right strategies are in place, following a proper and current assessment of the security reality.
3. Don’t assume, assess
The reality and status of security changes by the day, if not the hour, especially in a globalized world when events thousands of kilometers away can directly affect within minutes what happens in our backyard. That means threats and vulnerabilities can appear where no one expected them to be, and assessing the danger requires a global perspective. Yet security is also localized. For example, what works in London may not apply to Birmingham, Brighton or Manchester, as the threats, targets and opportunities vary from city to city, neighborhood to neighborhood, because terrorism is circumstantial and opportunistic, and often, highly personal. Being able to work on such different and highly demanding fronts could seem like asking too much from a system which has a slow culture of change and has proven to be more reactive than pro-active. Nevertheless, when broken down, the security picture and possibilities to implement flexible and adapted strategies emerge.
The first step is to know what you have and understand the value of possible targets. When I was a student in Paris, I worked in a private school. One particular element was that this school had no sign, no indication of what it was. When I asked why the school had no sign, I was told it was for security purposes, to make sure the building couldn’t be identified as a target due to the importance of most of the children’s parents. The school administration understood that it was a realistic target for anyone with grievances and chose to limit the attention drawn to it on the street. I thought this was smart, easy to do and compatible to any budget. The school was fully aware of its target value.
Assessing proper target value is vital as it frames the target selection process for terrorists. Because terrorism is essentially a fight for symbols, understanding a target’s symbolic value is the starting point for target assessment. For example, in the 1960s, the Québec terrorist group Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ) targeted mailboxes and the statue of Robert Nelson because they represented the oppressive Canadian regime. More recently, soldiers in Canada, France and the United Kingdom were attacked because they represented military power. Or take the attacks on Jewish institutions, these are all symbolic aggressions in response to what the terrorists perceive as attacks on their beliefs and their interpretations of the conflicts in the Middle East.
Once the symbolic value is assessed, it is the tactical value of the target that requires evaluation. Many experts describe the post 9/11 terrorism as indiscriminate and attacking only soft targets, something I strongly disagree with and expressed on numerous occasions. If this was true, the village train station would be just as valuable a target, if not more, than the main train station of a city like Berlin, which makes no sense. This is where the tactical value comes in to play. Targeting the transport hubs of a country’s major cities has more value than other places, especially in the West, because the attack is seldom – if ever – related to an insurgency movement. It’s about the power of the attack, so “soft targets” also have to be meaningful targets, i.e. offer possible attention, impact value, disturbance factor and demonstration of power.
Being able to understand the target value allows for a more accurate allocation of resources and more flexibility. In the hype and panic that often follow attacks, (like in France, Belgium or Denmark) being on high alert with massive deployment does not help much, as we’ve seen in France. If anything, it merely provides more targets, or worse, indicates previously unknown targets to would-be terrorists. Yes, it is a show of force and it has incredible political value, but it helps very little in terms of actual counter-terrorism. By properly monitoring and protecting duly assessed targets, we would increase actual prevention and give security forces more flexibility to move and respond to emerging threats, i.e. limit the over-allocation of resources to one target at the cost of another credible target.
4. Technology does not solve every problem
An issue I’ve often encountered in my career is the focus on technology – or “toys” as I call them – rather than on strategy and information. Having millions of security cameras does not prevent attacks, but it does help in the tracking of a fugitive or with an investigation – things that happen after the attack occurred. Owning the latest weaponry does not deter much when terrorists use basic equipment, the most high-tech often being the kalachnikov they used in the attack. The most advanced metal detector or body scanner cannot prevent an attack if the human element behind it does not do its part, something I’ve witnessed in various airports for example.
When discussing the problem of Boko Haram with Nigerian security representatives, the main request was for more weaponry. Upon my question why they needed tanks to fight individuals that rode on motorbikes – thereby suggesting they needed something less cumbersome – they again turned the conversation towards weaponry. I’ve had similar discussions with western decisions makers, who pleaded for more cameras, higher fences or metal detectors. The issue is often one of image. The newest gun looks good; more cameras or border technology looks as if a problem is being addressed. But more often than not, the cutbacks and savings occur on the human element, which leads to the real errors, regardless of the area. The over-worked security guard at Heathrow, who reacted 15 seconds after the metal detector rang, would not have prevented a suicide bomber from igniting his bomb, no matter how loud the detector would have been. Instead, having personnel rotate on 15 min cycles for example – like it is customary for lifeguards at beaches and pools – would have allowed the guard to stay focused and properly use the metal detector, hence limiting human error and maximizing the technology’s value.
Technology is good and a great asset in counter-terrorism, but it does not take responsibility for security, it is a tool. If there are not enough qualified laborers to handle these tools, they become mere trinkets.
5. Understanding the reality of security
As much as it would be fantastic, we cannot eradicate terrorism, just as we cannot eradicate mass shootings, or murder, or theft. We can only limit the impact. We can limit the odds of 200 people dying in a train, or limit attacks on certain public spaces like museums, but it is nigh impossible to prevent attacks like the one that occurred in Sydney, Ottawa or Copenhagen. Some would argue that preventive detention is the solution. On paper, that would be correct. But the real question is what happens after the arrest? Where do we put these potential criminals in an era when governments are confronted with over-crowded prisons and when such institutions are massive breeding grounds for extremism? Should they be handed to under-funded deradicalization programs with state monitoring, exerting more pressure on resources? And the old ethical question of intent and action? Should we assume guilty until proven innocent?
The reality of security is that there are threats and risks every minute of every day, and we cannot always prevent them. Still, we focus so much on one of the rarest possible threats for various reasons of which many are political. It is imperative that we limit the hype around terrorism politically and in the media, because it does create attention, it does create a focus and worst of all, it does inspire individuals with various grievances to act violently on them.
After the attacks in New York and Washington of September 11, 2001, Europe, because of its history with terrorism, had a more moderate reaction than the American government. It again showed great restraint and intelligence after the attacks in Madrid and London, but it became obsessed with the idea of foreign fighters and potential terrorism acts since late 2013. Something that has become almost a self-fulfilling prophecy. The threats, like in Braunschweig, Germany, on February 15, 2015, are serious and must be handled accordingly, but we have to limit the scope of its resonance. As the author Percy Kemp once said, an act of terrorism in a Western country will have ten times more impact than the same attack in Beirut because of the political, media and sociocultural interpretation and reaction. It is therefore essential to show restraint, not in our way of fighting terrorism, but in the way we “promote” it. As we cannot prevent every threat from becoming real – that means understanding and acknowledging the reality of security – we must focus on the best ways to limit its impact by demonstrating the same cunning, flexibility and resourcefulness terrorists demonstrate when they attack our societies.
The solutions and strategies suggested in the two parts of this post are part of a larger picture of terrorism and political violence. Some of the solutions are not novel, but they have yet to be properly implemented and executed, thus it is important to reiterate them. However, the real solution is our attitude towards terrorism and counter-terrorism. Security forces ask for more money and resources and always have, while politicians have budget targets to respect. Providing new weapons and equipment to counter-terrorism units may appear useful on paper but doesn’t bring much when what is really required is an extra set of hands, ears or eyes.
Terrorism is highly personal, rooted in identity and romance. It needs no framework, no training, just beliefs and the will to act on them. This is why it can be so dangerous and potent, flexible, adaptable and difficult to track. Our attitudes need to match this simplicity, and this will be reflected in our strategies and measures and eventually in limiting the impact of the romantic appeal terrorism can have on individuals. As such, our response to terrorism must be measured – but not limited – and focused, flexible and practical. The response must not be rooted in short-term political gains but in a larger plan that takes into account the grievances of a society and addresses them horizontally. Only when the resources and assets involved in counter-terrorism actually complement each other, will we have the effective security net that will truly mitigate the impact of radicalization and terrorism.